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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT,

Case No. 16575
and
16738

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged with the crime of Theft, a
Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Sections 76-6-40
and 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (as amended), in that on
or about the 26th day of March, 1979, they exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another with inten
to deprive that other of his property, such property being o
a value of more than $250.00 but not more than $1,000.00.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 1:00 A.M. of the day in

~uestion,

Officer Geslison of the Provo City Police Department observa
two individuals inside an all-night coin-operatej laundry
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the City of Provo.

Recognizing the individuals from

prior contacts and knowing that they were not local residents

(R. 41:15), he concluded without more that they might

be in the act of robbing the laundry.

The officer entered

the premises to question the suspects and observed that
the appellant Wh.:ittenback was sitting in a chair near the
entrance and that the appellant Parrett was standing near
a clothes-dryer in which several pairs of pants were being
dried (R.40:14).

They were in substantially the same

positions as when he saw them from his patrol car, and
had done nothing since he had first noticed them.

(R. 40:30-

41: 4).
The officer began to question the appellants.

Both

answered that they were merely doing their laundry (R. 41:2430).

As the questioning continued, two other officers,

Officers Mock and Latham, arrived in response to Officer
Geslison's request for aid.

One of the officers asked

whether they could search the appellants' car, which was
parked outside, and appellant Parrett, the owner of the car,
gave his permission.

(R. 42:27-43:4).

As Officers Mock and Latham conducted the search of
the car, Officer Geslison ordered the appellants to empty
their pockets (R.43:10-12).

He had noticed that appellant

Whittenback's pockets were bulging perceptibly, and on that
basis demanded the search (R.43:14).

Though neither of the

appellants had been placed under official arrest at that
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time, Parrett complied with the order, producing a ring
of keys; Whittenback, however, refused to empty his pockets
and demanded to know by what authority the officer could
make such a demand.

The officer asserted that he had the

authority to search their pockets, and Whittenback thereafter moved to a table and emptied a large quantity of
coins from his pockets.

Officer Geslison then quickly

patted down the clothing that appellant Whittenback was
wearing, as part of the search.
At roughly the same time, Officer Mock, having discovered burglary tools in his search of the appellants'
car, returned into the laundry and placed the appellants
under arrest for possession of burglary tools (R.60:24;
65:19).

The contents of the car were then inventoried at

the scene (R.67:21).
The owner of the laundry examined the machines on the
premises to determine whether any of their contents had
been stolen.

Fourteen machines had had their cash boxes

emptied (R.15: 18-24) but there was no record of what quanti:
of coins had been in them prior to that time.

It was durin1

the following several days that the owner examined the
contents of the other machines on the premises to determine, by comparison, how much money may have been in those
which were empty (R.16:27; 23:22).

At trial, the owner

testified that different machines hold different amounts of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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money at different times of the year (R.26:3-15; 26:2327:6), and that because he kept no accurate records of
their contents and did not account for their proceeds on
any regular basis, he could only guess as to the amount of
money that may have been missing (R.24:11; 32:24-33:3).
He testified that it was his estimate that $600 to $800 was
missing.
Prior to trial, appellants moved to suppress all the
items of evidence found in their pockets and in their car,
which motion was denied at the close of trial.

Appellants

also moved for dismissal on the grounds of the State's
failure to offer substantial evidence on the issue of
value, but that motion was denied, as was their motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were tried in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, the Honorable George E. Ballif presiding, on the 29th day of March, 1979.

On the basis of

the denials of appellants' motions and the verdict of the
jury, appellants were adjudged guilty of the charges against
them.

Appellant Whittenback was sentenced on the 29th day

of June, 1979, and appellant Parrett on the 12th day of
October, 1979.

Notice of appeal was timely filed by both

appellants, and their cases were joined for the purposes of
this appeal on the 30th day of October, 1979.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request that the Court
reverse the decision of the District Court denying their
Motion to Suppress and enter an order requiring that all
evidence produced as a result of the appellants' detention
be suppressed.

Appellants also request, in the alternative

that the court reverse the decision of the District Court
denying their Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and enter an order granting
them a judgment of innocence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DETENTION AND QUESTIONING OF THE APPELLANTS WAS A
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ALL EVIDENCE
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THAT DETENTION AND QUESTIONING
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-

tion provides, in part, that:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .
It is undisputed that the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment apply to a wide variety of situations in which
law enforcement officers confront individuals for the
purpose of investigating criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
-5-

(1968): Adams
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V.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612

(1972).

Whether the stopping and questioning of a person

in a public place constitutes a search or seizure of his
person for the purposes of the Amendment, and whether it
is reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances, are
questions which are dealt with by the courts almost as
often as they are confronted by the police.

A number of

clear principles have become established by the decisions
of the courts which demonstrate under what circumstances
the police may lawfully, without a warrant, approach an
individual whom they suspect of criminal activity and
initiate an interrogation. Appellants submit that under the
facts of this case, the police violated those principles
and were not justified in approaching the appellants and
questioning them concerning their presence in the laundry,
and that as a result of that unlawful conduct of the police,
all evidence obtained in the ensuing events should have
been excluded from the trial.
In Terry v. Ohio, an officer of the Cleveland police
department was serving in a plainclothes capacity and
observed two persons who attracted his closer attention.
The persons were standing on a corner, and while the officer
watched, one and then the other left the corner and walked
some distance down the street and returned, pausing momentarily both ways to stop and look into a particular store
window.

They repeated the procedure five or six times each.
-6-
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The officer concluded that they might be casing the store
for a robbery, and he approached them to ask some question:
In the following interchange, he frisked the individuals
for weapons.
The Supreme Court's opinion in the case deals
with

the

prima~

issue whether the limited pat-down search for

weapons, not based upon a warrant nor upon probable cause
sufficient to arrest, was justified.

It specifically

reserved the question, under what circumstances an officer
is justified in approaching a suspicious person for the
purpose of questioning.

See opinion, note 16.

However,

its statements concerning the scope and effect of the Fourt
Amendment are applicable to such a question, and since that
is the crucial question in this case, it is valuable to
discuss the opinion here.
In regard to any intrusion upon the privacy of an
individual, the court stated:
[I)n justifying the particular intrusion the polio
officer must be able to point to s cific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion. Anything less would invit
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulable hunches, a result this court has consistent~
refused to sanction. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
The court rejected the proposition that the good faith of
the officer would be sufficient to limit the effect of the
intrusion.

Even under such a circumstance, the individual

-7-
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might perceive the conduct of the police as harrassment
or as a violation of his privacy.
Under our decisions, courts still retain their
traditional responsibility to guard against
police conduct which is overbearing or harrassing,
or which trenches upon personal security without
the objective evidentiary justification which the
constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in
criminal trials.
Id. at 15.
Although the persons questioned in Terry were not detained
in their homes or in any other place where they would
normally expect "privacy," the court held that their brief
detention and questioning constituted a seizure for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment:
[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy, [cite omitted], he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusions.
. Unquestionably petitioner was
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland.
* * * It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment
governs "seizures" of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and
prosecution for a crime--"arrests" in traditional
terminology.
It must be recognized that whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person.
Id. 9, 14.
Appellants submit that the conduct of the officers in this
case constituted such a seizure, and that since the police
could point to no articulable facts which justified their
belief that a crime was in progress, that seizure was
unjustified.

Testimony at the hearing on the motion to

suppress and at trial indicated that Officer Geslison knew

-8-
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nothing more than that the two individuals were in an allnight establishment doing their laundry, that they were
from out-of-town, and that the hour was late.

None of

the~

facts singly nor together gives rise to a justifiable suspicion that the defendants were engaging in any criminal
activity.

The officer therefore acted unlawfully in

approaching the appellants and interrogating them.

For thE

purpose of argument, the facts that their car was subjected
to a search and that they were compelled to empty their
pockets all before formal arrest were sufficient to show
that that freedom to leave was restrained.
A number of recent cases lend support to the
argument, under similar factual circumstances.
Tony C., 582 P.2d 957

appella~

In In re

(Calif. 1978), the California Supreme

Court considered a case in which a police officer was on
patrol in a residential area of La Puente, California durin
school hours.

He noticed two black youths walking along

the sidewalk, both about 13 years of age.

He made a turn

and drove by them again, and saw one standing on a corner,
He drove on and made another

but could not see the other.

turn to come back, and this time saw both of them again.
The officer pulled over, stopped the youths, and began to
question them about their identities and reason for being
in the area.

His interrogation led to the arrest of the

defendant, one of the youths.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

The court first concluded that the defendant was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection at the time he was
stopped.

It stated:
Because of the limited scope of that invasion
in the present context, it need not be supported
by the actual belief in guilt required to arrest,
book, and jail an individual on a named criminal
charge.
Yet the interest at stake is far
from insignificant: it is the right of every
person to enjoy the use of public streets, buildings, parks, and other conveniences without
unwarranted interference or harrassment by agents
of the law. * * * Balancing these factors, the
courts have concluded that in order to justify
an investigative stop or detention, the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must
include specific and articulable facts causing
him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to
crime has taken place or is occurring or about to
occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or
detain is involved in that activity.
Not only
must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion,
but it must be objectively reasonable for him to
do so: the facts must be such as would cause any
reasonable police officer in a like position,
drawing when appropriate on his training and
experience .
. to suspect the same criminal
activity and the same involvement by the person
in question.
The corollary to this rule, of
course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch
is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting
in complete good faith.
(Terry v. Ohio, supra,
392 U.S. at p.22, 88 S.Ct. 1868) 582 P.2d at 959.

The court noted that the word "detention" is subject to a
wide variety of constructions, and that police conduct which
merely constitutes "contact" with persons requires no justification at all.

However, the court rejected the use of the

test by which a "detention" for Fourth Amendment purposes
results when a person is not free to walk away from the

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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encounter, since the subtleties of the situation often make
it impossible for the court, by hindsight, to determine
whether the victim of the arrest was actually detained or
only believed that he was.

Instead, the court ruled that

a "detention" falls under the protection of the Amendment
whenever the police accost an individual whom they suspect
to be involved in criminal activity.

The court stated:

A more fruitful approach focuses on the purpose
of the intrusion itself.
If the individual is
stopped or detained because the officer suspects
he may be personally involved in some criminal
activity, his Fourth Amendment rights are implicated and he is entitled to the safeguards of the
rule set forth above.
Finding that the officer in that case had stopped the

def~

dant for the very purpose of investigating the defendant's
suspected criminal activity, the court held that the Fourtl
Amendment test would apply, even though the questioning
took place openly on a public sidewalk.

Furthermore, the

court held that the officer could not point to specific
facts which justified the approach of the defendant and his
questioning.

The fact that two youths were walking on the

sidewalk during school .hours was easily

explaina~le

terms of a number of innocent activities.

in

The fact that

there had been several burglaries in the area and that thre
male blacks were being sought for arrest had nothing to do
with the defendant and his companion, who could not at firs
sight be identified in any way with those burglaries.

":\

day-old burglary report does not transform a residential
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

neighborhood into a no-man's land in which any passerby is
fair game for a roving police interrogation."

Even the

fact that the two youths parted company in a suspicious
manner did not justify their questioning.

The court said:

In short, viewed either singly or collectively,
the circumstances known to [the officer] did not
support a reasonable suspicion that Tony and his
companion were involved in criminal activity when
he observed them walking along the sidewalk.
582 P.2d at 963.
The stop and questioning of the defendant was therefore
unlawful, though otherwise innocent and in good faith, and
all knowledge obtained as a result of that conduct was
inadmissible in court.

Specifically, when another officer

was called to the scene and recognized Tony as a suspect
wanted on a warrant, the evidence found when he was searched
after his arrest was inadmissible.

Though his identification

by the other officer did not itself require Fourth Amendrnent justification, its fruits were inadmissible because
the defendant's initial stopping and questioning was illegal.
An almost identical case was decided in the same
fashion by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622

(8th Cir. 1971).

There,

an officer in Missouri observed a black male sitting at the
wheel of a new Cadillac parked in front of a pool hall.
While he watched, another black male emerged from the pool
hall and entered the car on thE passenger side.

Noting

that the car had Nevada license plates, the officers
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approached the individuals to question them about the
license plates and about their purpose for being in the
area.

When one man rolled down the window of the car, the

officer immediately smelled marijuana and placed the men
under arrest.
Concluding first that the conduct of the officers
constituted a "seizure'' for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the court stated:
[T]he police action here amounted to a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted by Terry and Carpenter.
Even though
Nicholas may have been physically free to drive
away when the officers stationed themselves on
either side of Nicholas' car and flashed their
badges, we find that the actions of the officers
constituted sufficient show of authority to
restrain Nicholas' freedom of movement.
The court then addressed the issue, reserved in Terry,
[N]amely, whether an investigative "seizure" for
less than probable cause, for purposes of
"detention" and/or interrogation is constitutionally permissible.
448 F.2d at 623.
The court conceded at first that if the police acted unlaw·
fully in detaining the defendant for the purpose of questioning, then the fruits of that detention, the evidence
of the marijuana, would be inadmissible, even though its
discovery could be justified otherwise on the doctrine of
consent (in that the defendant voluntarily rolled down the
window) or the doctrine of plain view (i.e., plain smell).
The government contended that police are authorized in
momentarily detaining individuals for the purpose of questioning on less than probable cause.

The court answered:
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In light of these facts, we think that, at best,
the police were acting upon a generalized suspicion that any black person driving an auto with
out-of-state license plates might be engaged in
criminal activity.
The momentary detention of a
citizen for questioning is not permitted on such
scant basis.
Id. at 625.
Thus, the court held that though questioning on less than
probable cause may be permissible in some circumstances, it
was not here, where police could not affirm that they were
investigating any particular crime, that they had any
information concerning the defendants or their car, that
there was any indication of an actual crime in progress,
or that there was anything else which pointed substantially
to the existence of criminal activity.
The same reasoning, always drawn from the opinion in
the Terry case, runs through a number of similar cases.
In United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976),
police officers stopped their car beside another car which
was parked by the road, thinking that it contained two
detectives whom they were waiting to meet.

Seeing, instead,

that the car contained two black men, the police concluded
that it was the wrong car.

But rather than drive on, they

approached the men to question them.

The court held that

such conduct by the police was unlawful.

They knew only

that the car had been driving slowly, that it was a new
car in a poor neighborhood, and that it looked like an
unmarked police car.

The court stated:
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In the instant case, the facts known to the offi 0
at the time he stopped the defendant clearly did
not rise to the required level, and in reality
were so tenuous as to provide virtually no groun&
whatsoever for suspicion . . . In short, the
officer simply stopped two black males because
they were in a black Chevrolet.
This fact alone
without additional reliable evidence sufficient '
to warrant the conclusion that either or both of
the men had been or were involved in criminal
activity did not constitute cause to stop the
vehicle.
Similarly, in United States v. Mallides, 473 F. 2d 859 (9t
Cir. 1973), a reversal resulted on a showing that an offi0
had stopped for questioning a car occupied by six Mexicanlooking men who sat upright and did not turn to look at
car as he drove by.

h~

On the reasoning of Terry, the court

held the stop of the car unlawful, and also concluded that
because the stop was unlawful, the search of the car's
trunk, though conducted with the consent of the driver, wa:
also unlawful and the evidence found therein was excludab1
The Terry rationale was also the basis of the decision of
the Sixth Circuit in Riccardi v. Perini, 417 F.2d 645

(6th

Cir. 1969), where officers merely observed a car traveling
slowly through an area where burglaries had recently
occurred and stopped the driver for questioning.

The

court held that the stop was unlawful and the fruits

ther~

inadmissible.
The Tenth Circuit applies the same rule as the cases
cited above.

In United States v. McDevitt,

508 F.2d 8 (l~

Cir. 1974), an officer stopped a truck on the highway in
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order to determine whether it was carrying goods for hire
in violation of a New Mexico statute.

The driver's papers

were in order, but rather than release the truck, the
officer continued investigating and finally learned that
the driver was wanted on a military warrant and was in
possession of marijuana.

In overturning his conviction

and ruling that all the evidence should have been excluded
which resulted from the encounter, the court stated:
In order for an officer to stop and search a
vehicle there must exist some basis for suspicion,
at least, that the driver has violated the law,
even though the facts need not be sufficient to
establish probable cause .
. In the case at
bar, there was no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.
508 F.2d at
10, 11.
See also United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir.
1972).

Both cases relied upon Terry and the rules appli-

cable to seizure of persons for their rationale.
The rule is therefore well established, following the
Terry decision, that police officers must be able to point
to specific, articulable facts which justify a reasonable
belief that criminal activity is in progress before they
may approach for questioning any person who is suspected
of being involved in such activity.

If the police accost

a person without first obtaining a knowledge of sufficient
facts, any evidence obtained as a result of that encounter
is inadmissible, disregarding the fact that it would otherwise be justified by some other exception to the warrant
requirement, such as consent, plain view, search incident
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to

arrest , or probable cause with exigent circumstances.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9
L. Ed. 2 d

4 41

( 19 6 3 ) .

Appellants assert that in the case at bar, the
police were unable to point to any specific facts which
justified them in approaching the appellants or detaining
them for the purpose of interrogation.

Before the conduct

in question, the police knew only that the appellants were
from out-of-town, that they were in an all-night establishment late at night, and that they were doing their
laundry.

These facts gave the police no reasonable justi-

fication for questioning the appellants, and such questim
when it was for the purpose of determining whether the
appellants themselves were involved in criminal activity,
was unlawful.

Therefore, all evidence produced as a resul

of that initial encounter was tainted by the illegality

o:

the police conduct and should have been excluded.
II.

THE SEARCH OF APPELLANTS' CLOTHING WAS UNLAWFUL, AND
THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THEIR POCKETS 7HEREFORE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
In the alternative, assuming that the police did

have a reasonable basis for questioning the appellants, th
search of their pockets on less than probable cause was
unlawful.

Under the circumstances of this case, there arE

only two possible grounds for sustaining the search of the
appellants' pockets, at a time when they were ~at under
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arrest but were acting under the authority of the officer.
Either the officer had probable cause to arrest the appellants, and therefore could search them pursuant to their
arrest even though the arrest followed the search, or,
lacking probable cause to arrest, the officer was nonetheless justified in conducting a limited search under certain
circumstances.
Facts supporting the argument that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the appellants do not appear in
this case.

In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct.223, 13

L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), the United States Supreme Court articulated the test applicable to determine whether officers have
probable cause to arrest without a warrant.

The same test

applies to searches conducted substantially at the same
time as the arrest.

The court stated:

Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid
depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the
arrest was made, the officers had probable cause
to make it--whether at the moment the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the petitioner had committed
or was committing an offense.
In the present case, it is clear from a perusal of the
testimony that there was not sufficient evidence in the
officer's knowledge at the time of the search of the appellants to constitute probable cause to arrest them, and the
same circumstance leads to the conclusion that the officer
was not justified by probable cause in searching their persons.
-18-
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Howeve:c, Terry v. Ohio, supra, recognized that unde
certain circumstances officers may make limited searches
of the persons of susFects even though probable cause to
arrest is lacking.

Balancing the rights of the individuai

to be free from unnecessary and unreasonable intrusions
upon his person against the need of the officer to ascertain whether the suspect is armed and dangerous to his or
anyone else's safety, the court concluded that police
officers, even in the absence of probable cause, may conduct limited searches of the persons of suspects in order
to discover weapons.

The court stated:

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has
to be struck in this type of case leads us to
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer
wrere re has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual for a
crime.
The officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.
The justification for searches allowed by Terry is limitei
however, to searches for weapons, and does not extend to
searches for evidence or other contraband.

The court adde

Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike
a search without a warrant incident to a lawful
arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent
the disappearance or destruction of evidence
of crime.
See Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 18 L.Ed.2d
777 (1964).
Furthermore, the courts have not, in the time since Terry,
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extended the rule of Terry to allow searches on less than
probable cause for anything other than weapons.
Therefore, appellants argue that on the facts of
this case, the police officer who questioned them, regardless of whether that questioning was lawful or unlawful,
had no justification for ordering them to empty their
pockets.

His action in doing so and in patting down their

outer clothing constituted a search without warrant and
without probable cause, and was unlawful.

The evidence

obtained from their pockets therefore should have been
excluded.
III.

THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANTS'
WARRANT AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED
ESTABLISHED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE CAR
BEEN SUPPRESSED.

CAR WAS WITHOUT A
UNDER ANY OF THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE

Appellants noted above that the search of the car
would, under their first argument, be a product of the
illegal questioning and detention of the appellants.

As

such, the fruits of that search would be inadmissible.
In the alternative, appellants argue that on the
general principles of the Fourth Amendment, the search
cannot be justified under the circumstances of this case.
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches be accompanied by a warrant, unless they can be supported by one
of the well recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Here, none of those exceptions is applicable.

-20-
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Under very similar facts, the United States Supreme Court
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022,
29 L.Ed.2d 564

(1971) held that the search of an arrestee'

car which was parked in his driveway at the time he was
arrested could not be justified under the Fourth Amendment
Here, as in that case, the police did not have probable
cause to search the car, nor were there exigent circumstances which threatened the imminent removal or destruction of evidence, so that the probable cause exception
would not apply.

Coolidge, supra.

Nor would the so-

called automobile exception apply, for the reasons stated
in Coolidge.

Similarly, the plain view exception is

irrelevant on the facts of this case, since it requires
that the officer encounter evidence inadvertently, not
as a result of a search.

Coolidge, supra.

The only

exception upon which the state might rely is the exception allowing a search pursuant to consent given by the
owner of the property.

Appellants submit that the search

of the car in this case was not based upon a voluntary
consent.
In the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.
218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854

(1973), the Supreme

Court reaffirmed that the guiding principle in the area
of consentual searches is that in order for the search to
be valid, the consent must be freely and voluntarily givm
The court applied a "totality of the circumstances'' test
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and held that certain factors weigh heavily against a
finding of consent.

It stated:

(I]f under all the circumstances it has appeared
that the consent was not given voluntarily-that it was coerced by threats or force, or
granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority,--then we have found the consent
invalid and the search unreasonable.
Appellants claim that under the circumstances of this
case, the consent given to search the car was coerced and
granted only in submission to the police officers' show
of authority, and was therefore invalid and the search
was non-consentual and unlawful.
A number of cases support the proposition that
where the police obtain consent to search by asserting
a false claim of authority, the consent must be found to
be involuntary.

In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543, 412 U.S. 218, 93 s.ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854

(1973),

officers went to the home of a suspect and informed the
suspect's grandmother, who met them at the door, that
they had a warrant to search the house for the suspect.
In fact, they did not have a warrant.

The state, at a

hearing on a motion to suppress the fruits of the search,
therefore attempted to justify the search on the grounds
that the grandmother allowed the officers to enter and
thereby consented to the search.

The court held against

the government, on the ground that a false claim of
authority vitiates consent.

The burden is on the party
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seeking to prove consent to show that it was freely and
voluntarily given, and such burden was not met where the
consent followed a false claim of authority to search by
police.
Some courts apply a rule which requires that
consent obtained after any illegal act of the police is
per se involuntary.

In Taylor v. State, 355 So.2d 180

(Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1978) the Florida appeals court stated:
Some broad trends are discernible in the cases.
One of those broad trends is that any serious
illegal actions by a law enforcement officer,
such as an illegal arrest, almost always renders
involuntary any subsequent consent to search
given by the victim of the illegal action . .
The only exception recognized by the cases in
which a prior illegal arrest or search would
not render a subsequent consent, confession, or
admission involuntary is where there has been
a clear and unequivocal break in the chain of
illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint
of the prior illegal action.
355 So.2d at 184.
Thus, many courts would recognize the rule that an illegal
arrest would vitiate a later consentual search unless some
event or influence intervened between the illegal arrest
and the consent, to cure the taint of the illegal act.
Other courts do not accept the per se rule render·
ing consent involuntary whenever an illegal arrest precede
the consent, but rather grant great weight to the fact
that an illegal act has occurred in determining whether,
on the basis of all the circumstances, the consent was
voluntary.

In United States v. Bazinet, 462 F.2d 982 (8th

Cir. 1972), the Eight Circuit stated:
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The mere fact that a person has been arrested
in violation of his constitutional rights casts
grave doubt upon the voluntariness of a subsequent consent.
The government has a heavy
burden of proof in establishing that the consent
was the voluntary act of the arrestee and that
it was not the fruit of the illegal arrest.
Similarly, in United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849 (9th
Cir. 1974) the Ninth Circuit held that such factors as
the prior arrest of the appellant, the illegality of that
arrest, and the failure of the police to inform the appellant that he had a right to deny consent to search were
significant and weighty arguments for the contention that
his later consent to a search was involuntary.

Since the

arrest in that case was ultimately found to be legal, and
the consent therefore voluntary, the Ninth Circuit decision
illustrates the importance of whether the consenting party
is in custody lawfully at the time of his consent.

The same rule is followed in the Third Circuit,
which stated in United States v. Molt, 589 F.2d 1247
(3d Cir. 1978):
When evidence exists to show the opposite--that
a defendant believed he must consent--such evidence weighs heavily against a finding that consent was voluntarily given. And when that belief
sterns directly from misrepresentations by government officials, however innocently made, we
deem the consent even more questionable.
589
F.2d at 1251-1252.
Appellants submit that the circumstances of this
case show that their consent to the search of the car was
a product of the illegal actions of the officers and of
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their false show of authority.

Their argument above

demonstrates that the initial contact of the appellants
by the police was a violation of their constitutional
rights.

While they were unlawfully detained and questioni

in disregard of their rights, two more officers arrived
on the scene to aid Officer Geslison in conducting the
"investigation."

t~

The illegal detention, coupled with

reinforcement of the investigating officer by more office:
together with all other circumstances surrounding the
encounte~

raise a heavy presumption that the consent to

search the car was not freely and voluntarily given.
Appellants contend that the District Court failed to

ta~

note of this presumption.
Even if the detention and questioning of the appe:
lants were found to be lawful, the same rules concerning
the voluntariness of their consent to search would apply,
with the same result.

Where a suspect is in custody, the

courts have held that there is a strong inference that hD
consent to a search is not voluntary.
386 F.2d 688

In Oliver v. Bowen:

(9th Cir. 1967), where a suspect was sub-

jected to a search of his person and then placed under
arrest, after which he gave consent to search his apartment, the court stated:
Equally was there basis for the court to regard
the search made thereafter of Bowens' apartment
as not being satisfying of a voluntary consent
with the impact inherent from the official aut~
ority exercised over him, in having made a
search of his person without expressed consent;
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in having placed him under arrest and put
on him; and in pressing him in
impl1cat1onal follow-up with whether "he
minded if we took a look," when he had just
declared to them that there was nothing in
the apartment to conceal.
386 F.2d at 691.
~andcuffs

See also U.S. v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408

(5th Cir. 1973);

U.S. v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
Appellants therefore submit that where they were
already in custody and subject to a coersive show of
authority by the police officers, and especially where
their interrogation was unlawful, the consent to search
the car was not voluntary, and the search of the car was
unlawful.
IV.

BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL,
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN, THE STATE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME: AND THE
APPELLANTS WERE THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL.
Section 76-1-501 of the Utah Criminal Code states:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.

One of the elements of the offense in the present case
was that the value of the property alleged to have been
taken was between $250.00 and $1,000.00.

That element,

along with all the other elements of the offense, was
required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, before
the appellants could be found guilty of the charges against
them.

Appellants submit that such element was not proven
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beyond a reasonable doubt and that there was such a lack
of evidence on that issue that the court should have
granted either the appellants' motion to dismiss or their
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The test on appellate review of the sufficiency
of evidence to prove an essential element of an offense
has been stated by a number of cases in Utah.

In State

v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he weight of evidence and credibility of
witnesses are reserved exclusively for jury
and reviewing court will not interfere unless
evidence is found to be so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable dou~
Similarly, in State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah 1976),

the court asserted:
This court has long upheld the standard that
on appeal from conviction the court cannot
weigh the evidence nor say what quantum is
necessary to establish a fact beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the evidence given is
substantial.
The fact that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
subject to the same rules as the motion to dismiss or to
render a directed verdict is confirmed by the case of
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), in
which

the court held:
The trial court's action in granting the postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is corrunonly referred
to as one for judgment notwithstanding the
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verdict.
In passing on such motion, the
court is governed by the same rules as it is
when passing upon a motion for a directed
verdict.
In other words, the trial court can
enter the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
only for one reason, the absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict.
Therefore, if the court determines that there was not
substantial evidence in this case on the question of the
value of the property allegedly stolen, it is the duty of
the appellate court to reverse the conviction.
·In cases of larceny, the general rule applied to
the determination of the value of the property stolen is
that for the purposes of the criminal law, the value of
the property is its fair market value at the time the property was taken.

State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977).

On the question of fair market value, only evidence having
a substantial relation to the fair market value at the
time and place the theft occurred is relevant and admissible;
and numerous decisions in the courts have held that evidence
of value by any other method of valuation is incompetent
and inadmissible.

For example, in People v. Latham, 110

P.2d 101 (Ct.App.Calif. 1941), evidence of the replacement
value of stolen machines was held to have been inadmissible
on the question of the value of the machines for the purposes of the theft statute.

In State v. Gallegos, 312

P.2d 1067 (N.M. 1957), evidence of the original cost of a
plow and of its replacement cost were held inadmissible
on the question of fair market value for the purposes of
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criminal law.
393

Similarly, in People v. Paris, 511 P.2d

(Colo. 1973), the court stated:
While an owner of goods is always competent
to testify as to the value of his property,
it must, as we have said, relate to its value
at the time of thecornrnission of the crime.
Where, as here, the owner testifies only as to
the purchase price of the goods, such testimony
is competent evidence of fair market value only
where the goods are so new, and thus have
depreciated in value so insubstantially, as to
allow a reasonable inference that the purchase
price is comparable to current fair market val~

Finding that the purchase price testified to by the owner
was not substantially equatable with fair market value,
the court held the owner's testimony inadmissible and
stated:
Without competent evidence of fair market value
the jury would have had to base its determinati
of the value of the goods in question at the
critical time on pure speculation.
Although the property involved in this case was
cash and not some other kind of goods having an independe:
market value, the same principles governing the reliabili
and admissibility of testimony concerning valuation shou~
be followed here.

The cases cited above establish the

principle that when the issue concerns fair market value,
evidence derived by other methods of valuation is not
allowed because of the likelihood that the jury will be
misled and that the actual value of the property will be
misconceived.

Unless the alternate method of valuation

actually closely approximates the fair market valuation
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under the circumstances, the testimony based upon that
alternate method will be irrelevant and immaterial. The
objective of such a principle is that where the property
is of a type capable of close valuation, the evidence
must be precisely related to that valuation.
In this case, the evidence presented on the issue
of the value of the property taken was vague, imprecise,
and speculative at best.

The owner of the laundry

testified that he examined the machines and determined
which of them had been emptied of money.

However, he

was unable to say directly that they had been broken into,
or even that they could not have been empty before the
alleged theft.

He testified that he returned to the

laundry and during the next few days counted the money in
the other machines to determine how much might have been
in the machines that were found empty.

Such a procedure

is riddled with inaccuracies and vagueness, since the
laundry was open during those days and the other machines
were presumably constantly taking in more money.

Further,

the owner admitted that he could not say when was the last
time he emptied the machines in question, nor had he kept,
prior to the alleged theft, records of the all.cunt of the
proceeds produced by any particular machine.

He could

not even testify that all the machines were regularly or
periodically emptied at the same time, or that they produced the same amount of proceeds regularly.

In fact, he
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testified that the machines were of varying sizes and
th~

capacities, as concerning the amount of change which
would hold.

i

He testified also that he had a practice of

emptying some of the machines occasionally, leaving the
others, in order to obtain change to put in the dollarbill changer; and he could not and did not testify that
this may not

have been why the suspected machines were

empty.
In short, the kind of testimony introduced as to
the value of the property allegedly

taken was

complete~

unrelated to that value, in the same sense that replacement or original costs are unrelated to fair market

val~

In light of the established rules requiring that methods
of valuation be precise and avoid the possibility of

mi~

leading the jury, the method of valuation used by the
State's witness here, and upon which his testimony was
based, was unacceptable.

Since the methods used by the

owner of the laundry to determine the value of the propm
taken did not bear the necessary reliability and did not
on their face appear to arrive at a substantial equival5
of the actual value of the property taken, under the
circumstances, the evidence offered on the issue of val~
was irrelevant and inadmissible, and presented a serious
danger that the jury would be misled on the issue of
valuation.

The failure of ilieDistrict Court to grant t~
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appellants' motions for dismissal and judgment notwithstanding the verdict was therefore prejudicial error and
requires reversal.
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